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5. Finally, the model can be used to conceptualize (a) similarities and differences in the mental representations that are formed of stereotyped social groups and the representations that are formed of individual members of these groups, (b) the influence on both recall and judgment of information that subjects receive but later believe they should disregard, and (c) the influence of thinking about a person after relevant information has already been acquired.
Certain limitations of the model should be noted. For example, in the research paradigms in which the model has been evaluated, the information presented has typically described behaviors that were performed at different times and in different situations. The representations formed from temporally or causally related sequences of actions may take on additional complexity. Second, the model focuses on conditions in which subjects receive information about a person for the express purpose of forming an impression of this person. The processing of social information, and the representations that are formed from it, are highly dependent on how one expects to use the information at the time it is encoded (for fuller discussions of this contingency, see .
Objectives that do not require a general impression of a person (e.g., remembering the information presented, making specific types of judgments) may lead to the formation of different types of representations than the ones we postulate. Many of these differences will be noted in the context of our discussion that follows.
The present formulation should be distinguished from a more general conceptualization of social information processing that we have recently developed . This more general model postulates several processes that govern the way in which prior knowledge and new information combine to influence the representations that are formed of people, the storage of these representations in long-term memory, and the retrieval of these representations for use in making judgments. A key feature is its ability to take into account the role of different processing objectives that exist at the time information is received. However, it does not state the specific cog-nitive activities that come into play in attaining any particular objective, nor does it provide an understanding of the structure and content of the mental representations that result from these activities. The theory developed in this article may be viewed as a more precise statement of the encoding, organization, and judgment processes that are involved in attaining one particular processing objective.
The relation of our model to other formulations of person memory and judgment should also be noted. In particular, our model was stimulated by an earlier formulation of person memory proposed by Hastie (1980) . The Hastie model, however, was developed primarily to account for the recall advantage of behaviors that are inconsistent with trait-based expectancies. It was not intended to account for several other well-established memory and judgment phenomena. For example, behaviors that are evaluatively inconsistent with trait-based expectancies are often recalled better than behaviors that are evaluatively consistent. However, if we control for differences in their evaluative implications, behaviors are recalled better if they are descriptively consistent with the traits of the person who performed them (Wyer & Gordon, 1982) . Moreover, in many instances to be discussed later in this article, the relative recall advantage of evaluatively consistent and inconsistent behaviors appears to reverse (cf. Wyer & Martin, 1986) . More recently, Hastie and Park (1986) have analyzed how encoding conditions moderate the relationship between recall and judgment that is typically observed. This later conceptualization, however, does not specify the content and structure of the cognitive representations that underlie judgments and recall under these various conditions. Wyer and Carlston (1979) attempt to apply a spreading activation model (cf. J. R. Anderson, 1976; Collins & Loftus, 1975) to social memory and judgment phenomena. The model is extremely cumbersome, however, and few precise a priori predictions can be easily derived from it.
Other conceptualizations (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981) often emphasize the role of prototypes or schemata in the processing of person information. In effect, these formulations view schemata as filtering devices that lead to more easily assimilated and retained consistent information. However, these models (like those of Wyer & Carlston, 1979) have difficulty in accounting for the frequently better recall of information that is inconsistent with schema-based expectations. In addition, these models do not specify the structure of the representations that result from schema-based processing, and therefore they cannot address many of the phenomena for which our model has implications.
Our model consists of 15 postulates. These postulates govern (a) the initial encoding and organization of trait and behavioral information in the course of impression formation, (b) the storage in memory of the representations that are formed, and (c) the processes that govern the later retrieval and use of these representations, both for recalling the original information and for making judgments of the person to whom the information pertains. Although several of these postulates have been stimulated by extensive research, they are more than simple empirical generalizations. Considered separately and in various combinations, they generate predictions concerning a variety of new phenomena that extend beyond those that initially stimulated their development. The explanatory power of the postulates will become clear in the course of presenting the model and discussing its implications.
General Description of the Impression Formation Process
It is useful to describe the general stages of processing that we assume occur in the course of forming a person impression. In the typical experiment, subjects are asked to form an impression of a target on the basis of several different behaviors the person has manifested. For the present, assume that these behaviors are nonspecific as to time or situational context. As subjects read through the various behavior statements, we hypothesize that they engage in the following goal-directed activities:
1. Subjects attempt to interpret each of the target's behaviors in terms of a more general trait concept. If subjects already have a general expectation for the target's traits, they use these traits as bases for their interpretation. If, on the other hand, they have not formed expectations, subjects interpret the behaviors in terms of whatever applicable trait concepts happen to come to mind.
2. Partially on the basis of the trait inferences they have made, subjects try to form a general evaluative concept of the person as, for example, likeable or dislikeable. If this concept can be formed easily on the basis of the initial information, later information may have little influence on it. In some cases, however, the traits that subjects use to interpret the person's behaviors differ in favorableness, thus making a coherent evaluative impression of the person difficult to construct. In these cases, subjects mentally review the target's behaviors to determine whether a different, more evaluatively consistent set of traits might be equally applicable.
3. Once subjects have formed an evaluative concept of the person, they interpret the person's behaviors in terms of this concept. If a given behavior is evaluatively inconsistent with their general concept of the person, subjects think about it in relation to other behaviors the person has performed in an attempt to understand better why it occurred. In addition, they mentally review and reevaluate behaviors that are evaluatively consistent with their concept of the person in an effort to confirm its validity.
4. If subjects are later asked to make a specific judgment of the person, they will search for a general trait or an evaluative concept that is relevant to this judgment. If they find such a concept, they will use its implications for the judgment without reviewing the specific behaviors on which the concept is based. They will consider the implications of these behaviors only if none of the general concepts they have formed are directly relevant to the judgment they wish to make.
An associative network metaphor will be used to describe the representations we postulate. We assume that features of a person are represented by nodes in memory and that relationships between them are represented by associative linkages. It is crucial to remember, however, that structural features of the representations are the direct result of various cognitive processes. For example, an associative pathway between a trait concept and a behavior is usually the result of encoding the behavior in terms of the trait. Similarly, a pathway between two behaviors is theoretically established as a result of thinking about one behavior in relation to the other. An important objective of the theory is to specify how various cognitive structures develop over time. These structures and processes are described in the following section.
Encoding and Organizational Processes

Trait Encoding and Organization
Consider again a situation in which subjects are asked to form an impression of a target person who is described by a series of behaviors. Assume that some behaviors exemplify specific trait concepts, whereas others have no clear trait implications. Also assume that some behaviors are favorable and would typically elicit a liking for the person, whereas others are unfavorable and would normally elicit dislike.
We will consider two general conditions. In one, subjects have already formed a generalized expectancy for what the target person is like. This expectancy could result from the use of a group stereotype, from hearing someone describe the person, from identifying the person as a well-known public figure, or in any number of other ways. In the second case, subjects do not have any specific expectancy.
Postulate 1.
People who learn about a person's behaviors with the objective of forming an impression will spontaneously interpret these behaviors in terms of the trait concepts they exemplify, (a) This interpretation is made by comparing the behavior descriptions with the features of various trait concepts that are stored in memory.' (b) When more than one trait concept is applicable for interpreting a behavior, the concept applied is the one that is most easily accessible in memory.
This postulate has important implications. One is that the trait encoding of behaviors is a fundamental component of impression formation that is performed spontaneously; that is, it takes place in the absence of any explicit demand to perform the activity.
2 When a subject has already acquired specific expectancies, trait concepts associated with these expectancies are likely to be activated at the time the behavioral information is acquired. If these concepts are applicable for interpreting the behaviors, they will typically be the ones that are used. In some cases, however, subjects will not have any specific trait expectancies for the person. In these cases, they will encode the person's behavior in terms of whatever applicable trait concepts are most accessible. Thus, for example, the behavior giving someone an answer on an examination might be encoded as either kind or dishonest, depending on which of these trait concepts happens to be most accessible. As this example implies, many behaviors can be interpreted in terms of more than one trait. Consequently, objectively irrelevant factors that lead a particular concept to be highly accessible can affect the interpretation that is made. These factors may consequently have an enduring impact on the impression that is formed (for more formal theoretical accounts of these processes, see Bargh, 1984; Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer&Srull, 1981 . It is worth noting that the encoding of a behavior may not contain all of the features that were present in the original description. Similarly, some features may be encoded at a higher level of abstractness than is actually presented. Thus, to interpret giving someone an answer on an examination as kind, the behavior may be receded as giving someone help on an exam or as helping someone out. These recodings are presumably reflected in the way that subjects reproduce the behavior if they are later asked to recall it (cf. Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) .
Although Postulate 1 is based primarily on research related to construct accessibility (Bargh, 1984; Higgins & King, 1981) This postulate has implications for the differential encoding of behavioral information as a result of prior expectancies. Suppose subjects learn that a target person has performed some honest behaviors, some kind behaviors, and some intelligent ones. If no expectancy exists at the time the behaviors are learned, Postulate 1 implies that three trait-based clusters will be formed. However, suppose subjects are told before they receive the information that the person is honest and kind, but the person's intelligence is not mentioned. Then, according to ' The specific feature comparison process involved here is left intentionally vague. It presumably involves a computation of the similarity between the features of the behavior and those that define the concept. Models of feature comparison (e.g., Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) and similarity judgment (Tversky, 1977) may be applicable in conceptualizing the nature of these computations. However, an elaboration of these processes is beyond the scope of this article and is unnecessary for conceptualizing the phenomena to be considered.
2 Our use of the term spontaneous in this context should not be confused with automatic. The latter term is typically used to refer to processes that take place without conscious awareness and that place few demands on the attentional system (Bargh, 1984; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) . By spontaneous, we simply mean that subjects consider the encodings of behavior in terms of traits to be an integral part of impression formation and that they perform this activity without explicit requirements to do so. (For some evidence that behavioral information is encoded in trait terms even when subjects do not have an impression formation objective, see Winter & Uleman, 1984.) Postulate 2, subjects will form trait-behavior clusters pertaining to only the two concepts that existed a priori, and a cluster pertaining to intelligent will not be formed. To the extent that the organization of behaviors into clusters facilitates their recall (see Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980b; Srull, 1983; Srull & Brand, 1983) , this implies that the intelligent behaviors will be recalled less well in the second condition than in the first.
Evaluative Encoding of Person Information
The first two postulates concern the encoding of behaviors on the basis of their descriptive (i.e., trait) implications. In contrast, the next three postulates concern the formation of an evaluative concept of the person and the further encoding of behaviors in terms of this concept.
Postulate 3. People who are asked to form a general impression of a person will attempt to construct a general concept of the person as likeable or dislikeable. This concept, although based on the trait concepts used to interpret the person's behavior, is primarily evaluative in nature.
Thus, for example, if an individual is described by behaviors that imply favorable attributes, subjects will form a general concept of the person as likeable.
3 This is often done by comparing the individual's attributes with those of a prototypic likeable or dislikeable person that already exists in memory. The concept may also be influenced by the affective reactions that subjects experience in the course of thinking about the person's behaviors and traits. In fact, a cognitive representation of these affective reactions may be an important feature of the evaluative concept that is formed (see .
Although the central features of the person concept that are formed are evaluative, its other, more peripheral features may include implications of the specific traits that led to its formation. In effect, this means that the concept of a likeable person that is formed from a description of him as warm and friendly differs in some respects from the concept of a likeable person that is formed from information that he is intelligent and witty.
Postulate 4. The evaluative concept of a person is formed on the basis of only a subset of the information available about the person. This is most often the first subset of information that permits an evaluatively coherent concept to be formed.
Note that Postulate 4 implies a primacy effect on judgments;
that is. the first information presented will have the greatest effect. The model as a whole places several constraints on the generality of this effect, however, as we will show presently.
Postulate 5. Once an evaluative concept of a person is formed, the person's behaviors are interpreted in terms of it. The ease of interpreting behaviors in terms of the concept, and therefore the strength of their association with it, is an increasing function of the behaviors' evaluative consistency with the concept.
In other words, if subjects form a concept of a person as likeable, favorable behaviors will become most strongly associated with the concept, followed by evaluatively neutral and then unfavorable behaviors. However, a subtle but important aspect of this postulate is worth noting. Specifically, behaviors of a person do not become associated with an evaluative concept until after this concept has been formed. In other words, behaviors that are learned before the development of this concept are not contained in the evaluation-based representation of the person.
Responses to Inconsistency
The traits and behaviors of a person are not always consistent.
At least three types of inconsistency may arise. First, a person's traits may differ in favorableness (e.g., a person may be both kind and dishonest). Second, a person may sometimes engage in behaviors that are descriptively or evaluatively inconsistent with the evaluative representation (e.g., a dishonest person may return a wallet containing money or a generally likeable person may do something reprehensible). Third, a person may sometimes manifest different attributes in different situations (e.g., a man who is friendly to his colleagues may behave tyranically at home). This third type of inconsistency will be considered in detail later in this article. Here, we will restrict our attention to the first two types.
Between-Trait Inconsistency
The processes that underlie the initial formation of trait-behavior clusters (see Postulate 1) lead the behaviors in each cluster to become associated with the central trait concept but not with each other. This is because the encoding of these behaviors in terms of the trait concept does not require that they be thought about in relation to one another. However, the primary goal in forming an impression of a person is to extract a coherent evaluative representation. If the trait concepts exemplified by the behaviors differ in favorableness, such a concept may be difficult to construct. In this case, Postulate 6 becomes relevant.
Postulate 6. If a clear evaluative concept of a person cannot be extracted on the basis of the initial information received, people who are uncertain about the person's traits will think about the behaviors they have encoded in terms of each trait in relation to one another to determine if they have interpreted these behaviors correctly. This cognitive activity leads associations to be formed among the behaviors that have been encoded in terms of each trait concept.
In terms of the network metaphor we are using, this means that pathways will be established among the behaviors within each trait-behavior cluster. Note, however, that pathways between behaviors that are contained in different clusters are not formed. Note also that the cognitive activity implied by Postulate 6 occurs only when subjects are uncertain about whether their trait encodings of the target's behaviors are correct. When subjects are given explicit information describing the traits of a person, they may be relatively confident of their interpretations.
The following postulate concerns the responses to behaviors that are inconsistent with the concept defining the evaluative person representation.
3 Note that the formation of this concept is restricted to conditions in which the subject's objective is to form a global impression of the person. If instead the objective is to form a more circumscribed impression (e.g., to decide if the person would be suitable for a particular job), descriptive as well as evaluative considerations may come into play.
Postulate 7. Once an evaluative person concept has been formed, behaviors of the person that are evaluatively inconsistent with this concept are thought about in relation to other behaviors that have evaluative implications in an attempt to reconcile their occurrence. This leads to the formation of associations among these behaviors. Behaviors that are either evaluatively neutral or evaluatively consistent with the person concept do not stimulate this activity.
Postulate 7 implies that the type of inconsistency that stimulates the formation of interbehavior associations is primarily evaluative rather than descriptive. It also assumes that associations are formed only among behaviors that have clear positive or negative evaluative implications.
Two implications of Postulate 7 are worth noting in the context of the associative network model we have adopted. First, evaluatively neutral behaviors are not associatively linked to any other behaviors. Therefore, except for their association with the central person concept (Postulate 5), they are totally isolated from other behaviors in the representation. Second, the cognitive activity implied by Postulate 7 is stimulated only by the identification of evaluatively inconsistent behaviors. This implies that, on average, the number of associative pathways emanating from (and therefore leading into) inconsistent items will be greater than the number of pathways leading to and from consistent ones.
Our assumption that people think about inconsistent behaviors in relation to others does not preclude other types of cognitive activity as well. If an inconsistent behavior stimulates efforts to explain why the behavior occurred (Hastie, 1984) , it may also lead subjects to consider the behavior in relation to more general world knowledge and to consider situational factors that may have elicited the behavior (cf. Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983 ). This cognitive activity may lead inconsistent behaviors to become associated with concepts and knowledge other than those that pertain to the specific person who performed them. The interbehavior linkages that are formed according to Postulate 7 exist in addition to these other associations.
A second type of cognitive activity may also result from exposure to behaviors that are inconsistent with one's general concept of a person. Specifically, these behaviors may stimulate one to attend more carefully to information that confirms the validity of this concept in an attempt to bolster it. This possibility is taken into account by Postulate 8.
Postulate 8. People who are uncertain of the concept they have formed of a person will review the person's behaviors that are consistent with this concept in an attempt to confirm its validity. This activity strengthens the behaviors' association with this concept.
Note that the processes implied by Postulates 7 and 8 are analogous to those that occur when one receives information that is inconsistent with one's previously formed beliefs and attitudes; that is, one may try to reconcile the information by counterarguing (cf. Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970) or may attempt to bolster the threatened belief by identifying other reasons why the belief may be true (cf. Festinger, 1957) . In the present context, however, these activities have specific implications for the mental representations that are formed.
Illustrative Examples
Two examples are useful to convey the combined implications of Postulates 1-8. First, suppose subjects who expect a target person to be honest (F h ) and kind (r k ) receive three honest behaviors (h), one kind behavior (b^, three stupid behaviors (b s ), and two behaviors that have no evaluative implications (b 0 ). Also suppose that these behaviors are presented in the order: b 0
The resulting representations are displayed in Figure la . According to the model, subjects will form trait-behavior clusters defined by honest and kind. However, they should not form a cluster pertaining to stupid (Postulate 2). In addition, subjects should construct a concept of the person as likeable (P+), around which all of the specific behaviors are organized. Because of the prior expectancy, the associations between this concept and the honest and kind behaviors are stronger (represented by wider pathways in Figure la) than the associations between this concept and all other behaviors (Postulates 5 and 8). In addition, interbehavior associations are formed between evaluatively inconsistent (i.e., stupid) behaviors and the others, for reasons noted in Postulate 7. 4 Now, however, imagine that the same series of behaviors is given to a different group of subjects who do not have any expectancies for what the target is like. In this case, three trait-behavior clusters should be formed rather than two. Because the behaviors presented and the traits that they exemplify are evaluatively inconsistent, no clear evaluative concept of the person can be formed. On the other hand, this inconsistency, coupled with the absence of a priori expectancies, should decrease subjects' confidence that their trait encodings are correct. Therefore, interbehavior associations within each cluster should be formed for reasons described in Postulate 6. The representations formed under this condition should therefore resemble those shown in Figure Ib .
Priorities in Impression-Directed Information Processing
Implicit in our discussion is the assumption that people engage in several quite different cognitive activities en route to forming an impression. They encode behaviors in terms of traits, extract an evaluative concept of the person, and further encode the person's behaviors in terms of their evaluative consistency with this concept. In addition, they may attempt to reconcile inconsistencies between the person's behavior and the implications of the concept they have formed of the person, and they may review beliefs that are consistent with this concept in an effort to confirm its validity. Each of these activities places demands on the human processing system. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that when a large amount of stimulus information is presented in a short period of time, the simultaneous pursuit of all of the activities noted above may exceed the recipient's processing capacity. In other instances, a subject may simply be unmotivated to engage in the cognitive effort required to attain all of the goals to which these activities are directed.
In such instances it is reasonable to assume that subjects will not perform all of the activities we have postulated but will give some activities priority over others. This is particularly likely when processing demands are high. The failure to engage in one or more of the activities should theoretically be reflected in the content and structure of the representations that are formed. For example, if subjects do not engage in bolstering, behaviors that are consistent with the concept denning the evaluative person representation should be less strongly associated with this concept. If inconsistency resolution is not performed, direct associative pathways between inconsistent behaviors and others contained in the representation should not be established. The model we propose has the capability of evaluating these possibilities, as we will see. To do so, however, requires assumptions about the storage and retrieval of the representations that are formed and the extraction of information from them. The next two sections describe these assumptions.
Storage and Retrieval Processes Storage in Long-Term Memory
The next postulate pertains to the storage of person information in long-term memory. It flows directly from the general model of social information processing developed by Wyer and Srull(1986) .
Postulate 9. Each trait-behavior cluster that is formed as a result of encoding behaviors in terms of a trait concept, as well as the evaluation-based representation that is ultimately formed of the person, functions as a separate unit of information. All such representations are stored in memory independently of one another at a location pertaining to the person to whom they refer.
One implication of this assumption is worth noting. Specifically, each behavior of a person is potentially represented twice in long-term memory, once in a trait-behavior cluster (based on its descriptive implications) and once in the evaluation-based person representation (based on its evaluative implications).
The importance of this dual coding will soon become obvious.
Retrieval Processes
In this article, we consider two conditions in which subjects may retrieve and use the representations they have formed. The first occurs when they are explicitly asked to recall. The second occurs when subjects are asked to make a specific judgment or decision (whether the person is intelligent, friendly, or likeable, whether the person is suitable for a particular type of job, etc.).
Four postulates govern the retrieval of information in pursuit of the first objective. The first concerns the retrieval of particular representations, and the others pertain to the retrieval of specific behaviors within a representation.
Postulate 10. When people are asked to recall a person's behaviors, they retrieve the contents of one representation of the person at a time. When more than one representation is contained in the memory location pertaining to this person, the one that was stored most recently has the highest probability of being retrieved.
This postulate, which like Postulate 9 is consistent with the more general bin model we have proposed , has important implications. Different representations may contain quite different sets of behaviors. Moreover, even when a behavior is contained in more than one representation, it may be less accessible in some representations than in others. Therefore, factors that influence the accessibility of different representations will have an impact on the sorts of behaviors that subjects are likely to recall. Whenever there is no a priori basis for assuming which representations are most accessible, we will assume that the likelihood of retrieving any given representation is equal. One consequence of this assumption is that the likelihood of retrieving any particular representation is an inverse function of the total number of representations that has been formed.
The next postulate pertains to the retrieval of specific features of a particular representation (e.g., concrete behaviors) once the representation itself has been identified. Although it can be conveyed in several ways, we will do so in terms of the same associative network metaphor.
Postulate 11. Recall of the specific behaviors contained in a representation is the result of a sequential search process that begins at the central concept node and progresses along the various pathways in the network. Behaviors are recalled in the order they are activated in the course of this search, (a) When more than one pathway emanates from a particular node, the most likely path to be traversed is the one that reflects the strongest association between the nodes it connects, (b) When the only path emanating from a behavior node is the one by which it was accessed, the search is reinitiated at the central concept node.
Two other postulates are necessary to provide a complete account of memory retrieval.
Postulate 12. Traversing a pathway between two nodes increases the strength of association between them. It therefore increases the subsequent probability that recalling one of the concepts (behaviors) will cue the retrieval of the other.
Postulate 13. When a search activates n successive behaviors, all of which have been retrieved previously, the search is terminated.
Postulates 12 and 13 are very similar to assumptions made by Rundus (1971) and others in accounting for category set size effects; that is, the more often a particular associative pathway has been traversed, the more likely it is to be traversed again in the future (for evidence of this, see Raaijmakers & Shiflrin, 1980 . As the number of features connected to a central concept increases, the search process is likely to become localized in an area of the representation containing only a subset of its features, and the remaining features are less likely to be identified before the search is terminated (Postulate 13). Note that when interbehavior associations exist in the representation, the number of associations to any given behavior will increase with the number of behaviors contained in the representation, thus having a facilitating effect on the recall of this behavior.
However, holding constant the number of interbehavior associations that are formed, Postulates 12 and 13 imply that the likelihood of recalling a behavior will decrease, on the average, with the number of other behaviors contained in the representation.
The implications of Postulates 5-8 (i.e., the effects of behaviors' associations to the central concept node and to one another), in combination with Postulates 11-13, can be summarized in the following equation:
where P R (6,) is the probability of recalling behavior ft/, S (C, b,) is the strength of the behavior's association with the central concept C, S (bj, b,) is the strength of association of 6, with a second behavior b jr JV b is the total number of behaviors contained in the representation, and k is a constant.
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Implications of these postulates can be seen with reference to the examples provided in Figure 1 . Suppose subjects who have formed the representations shown in Figure la are asked to recall the behaviors presented. If they happen to retrieve a traitbehavior cluster, they will recall the behaviors that exemplify the traits constituting the cluster very well. Moreover, they * As has been noted by Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Srull (1984;  see also Raaijmakers & Shim-in, 1981) , an additional factor that must often be taken into account is the strength of association between these behaviors and contextual features of the situation in which the information is presented (i.e., characteristics of the experimental room, other participants in the experiment, etc.). This would be a third component of the equation. For simplicity, however, we will ignore this factor here.
should recall the behaviors in one cluster before recalling those contained in a second. Furthermore, assuming that both the cluster pertaining to kind and the cluster pertaining to honest are ultimately retrieved, subjects should be more likely to recall the kind behavior than any given one of the honest behaviors. On the other hand, subjects should recall both kind behaviors and honest behaviors better than stupid ones, because a cluster pertaining to stupid has not been formed.
However, suppose that subjects base their recall on the contents of the evaluation-based representation. According to Postulate 11, they should begin their search from the central concept node (P+) and progress down a pathway to a behavior that is strongly associated with it. Therefore, the first behavior they recall will most likely be an honest one. If they continue their search along the pathways emanating from this behavior, however, the next one they will encounter is likely to be a stupid behavior. In general, because more pathways lead to stupid behaviors than to honest ones, the stupid behaviors should enjoy an overall recall advantage. Note further that no pathways lead to neutral behaviors. These behaviors can therefore only be accessed from the central person concept node. Moreover, these behaviors are not represented in trait-behavior clusters. For both reasons, neutral behaviors should be recalled very poorly.
In contrast, suppose that subjects do not have trait-based expectancies for the target person at the time they learn about the person's behaviors, and therefore they form only the representations in Figure Ib . In this case, they should recall both honest and stupid behaviors equally well, provided they identify the trait-behavior clusters in which they are contained. Moreover, these behaviors may gain a recall advantage over the kind behavior. This is because the large number of interbehavior associations in the honest and stupid clusters may be sufficient to overcome the effects of set size.
The retrieval postulates outlined in this section are extremely important. This is because differences in the content and structure of different representations can be inferred from differences in the amount and type of information recalled, as well as the order in which this is done. Numerous examples of this are provided in the next section. 6 
Judgment Processes
The same representations that provide the basis for recalling information about a person are used as a basis for judgments. However, the particular aspects of the representations that are used to make judgments, and when they come into play, may differ considerably. The use of these representations depends, in part, on the type of judgment to be made.
Postulate 14.
A subject who is asked to judge a characteristic of a person will search for a representation of the person whose central concept specifically pertains to this characteristic. If such a representation is found, judgments are based on the implications of this concept without a review of individual behaviors.
Postulate 15. If a representation whose central concept has direct implications for a judgment cannot be found, the subject will retrieve and use the general evaluation-based person representation as a basis for the judgment. This judgment will be based on both Therefore, the target should not be judged as unintelligent as the stupid behaviors actually imply.
In contrast, suppose a subject who has formed the representations in Figure Ib is asked to make these same judgments. The subject's judgment of the target's honesty will be similar to that described in the preceding paragraph. However, an evaluative person concept with direct implications for the target's likeableness does not exist. One possibility is that the subject will simply make a neutral rating. Alternatively, the subject may try to combine the evaluative implications of the various trait-based concepts, thereby arriving at a judgment according to processes similar to those described by N. H. Anderson (1971 Anderson ( , 1981 . In addition, the target should be judged less intelligent in this case 6 The sequential search and retrieval processes implied by Postulate 11 distinguish our model from spreading activation models (cf. Collins & Loftus, 1975; Wyer & Carlston, 1979) . These latter models typically assume a parallel search process rather than a sequential one; that is, excitation spreads simultaneously along all pathways emanating from a concept node to other nodes. Excitation accumulates at the terminal nodes, and when the excitation at a given node reaches threshold, the item at the node is activated and recalled. Therefore, the first item recalled is the one located at the node at which excitation first reaches threshold. This model has several implications that are similar to the one we propose (e.g., the implication that behaviors that are more strongly associated with a concept node will be the most likely to be recalled). However, it has difficulty accounting for the sequence in which a series of interrelated behaviors are recalled (e.g., the behaviors contained in the evaluative person representation shown in Figure la ). In contrast, the model we propose makes explicit predictions concerning this sequence. Moreover, a spreading activation model is incompatible with our assumption that the different trait-based and person-based representations are stored and retrieved independently of one another (Postulates 9 and 10). The implications of these postulates have all been empirically supported, as we will see. than in the first example because the judgment is now based on the trait-behavior cluster associated with stupidity.
Summary
The 15 postulates are summarized in the Appendix. It is worth noting, however, that the model as described thus far is incomplete in several respects. First, we have not considered that some representations of persons are situation-specific and that the implications of these representations may differ. Second, we have restricted our attention to processing that occurs "on-line," although there are certainly situations in which people try to form a coherent impression of another on the basis of information they have already stored in memory. These matters will be addressed in the final sections of this article. First, however, we will summarize existing empirical evidence for the processes we have postulated.
We will organize our discussion around several issues. between the person's behavior and the general concept formed of him or her (including both attempts to reconcile the inconsistent behaviors and attempts to bolster the validity of the person concept). We then consider the priorities that underlie different stages of impression-directed information processing. Finally, we will turn to a consideration of the manner in which the representations formed of a person are used to make judgments and the relation of these judgments to the information that subjects can recall about the person being judged.
Role of Trait Concepts in Person Impression Formation
Postulate 1 states that subjects with an impression formation objective spontaneously interpret a person's behavior in terms of the trait concepts they exemplify. It also states that when more than one concept is applicable for interpreting a behavior, subjects will use the first concept that comes to mind. This postulate has diverse implications, which concern (a) the particular trait concepts that are used to interpret a person's behaviors, (b) the spontaneity of the trait encodings of behaviors that are processed for the purpose of forming an impression, and (c) the organization of these behaviors into separate trait-behavior clusters. Different lines of research bear on these implications.
One focuses on the effect of activating trait concepts on the interpretation of ambiguous behavioral information. The second concerns the organization of behaviors in terms of trait concepts and the effect of this organization on recall. We will discuss each line of research in turn.
Effects of Category Accessibility on Encoding of Behaviors
A trait concept becomes more accessible in memory immediately after it is used. Consequently, the concept is temporarily more likely to be used again to interpret new information and therefore is likely to affect judgments based on this information.
Many demonstrations of this have been reported (for reviews, see Bargh, 1984; Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1981) , and only one example will be provided here. Subjects in this study (Higgins et al., 1977) were first required to associate trait adjectives with different colors as part of a perceptual learning task. Then, a: part of an ostensibly different experiment, they were asked to form an impression of a target person on the basis of a written passage. The passage described behaviors that could each be interpreted in terms of either a favorable trait or an unfavorable one. For example, it indicated that the target "wanted to cross the Atlantic in a sailboat." In one experimental condition, several of the adjectives used in the first task (e.g., adventurous) were favorable and applicable for interpreting the passage. In another condition, the adjectives were applicable but unfavorable (e.g.,foolhardy). After reading the passage, subjects in each condition estimated their liking for the person described. These judgments were more positive when the trait concepts activated by the initial priming task had been favorable than when they had been unfavorable.
In interpreting these results, it is important to note that similar effects did not occur under control conditions in which the original trait concepts varied in favorableness but were descriptively inapplicable for interpreting the behavioral information.
This means that subjects'judgments of the target were mediated by an interpretation of the target's behaviors in terms of the specific traits that were primed. In other words, once the behaviors were encoded in terms of trait concepts, an evaluative person concept was extracted (Postulate 3), and this person concept was then used as a basis for judging the target's likeableness.
Postulate 1 implies that the trait encodings occur spontaneously at the time information about the target person's behavior is first received (see Footnote 2). Another possibility, of course, is that these encodings are not performed until the time of judgment, when they are necessary to comply with the specific demands of the task. However, evidence against this latter possibility was reported by Wyer (1979, 1980) . They found that priming trait concepts before subjects had read stimulus information had substantial effects on subjects' later judgments, whereas priming trait concepts after the information was presented had no effect at all. This suggests that behaviors are spontaneously interpreted in terms of whatever trait concepts are most accessible in memory at the time the behaviors are first learned. Further evidence that behaviors are spontaneously encoded in terms of trait concepts is provided in the next section.
Organization of Behaviors Into Trait-Behavior Clusters
The effects of trait-category accessibility on the interpretation of information (for reviews, see Bargh, 1984; Higgins & King, 1981) provide strong support for Postulate 1. If this postulate is valid, however, it has additional, quite different implications; that is, the encoding of a person's behaviors in terms of traits should lead to the formation of trait-behavior clusters.
Three quite different sets of data provide converging evidence for the existence of these clusters.
Trait-based clustering of recalled behaviors. Subjects who encode a set of behaviors in terms of trait concepts, thus forming trait-behavior clusters, should store these clusters in mem-ory as separate units of knowledge (Postulate 9). These clusters will later be retrieved and used as a basis for recalling the person's behaviors. If this occurs, it should be reflected in the order in which the behaviors are recalled. Specifically, subjects should retrieve and report the behaviors contained in one cluster before retrieving and recalling the behaviors contained in a second.
Results of a study by Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980b) support this prediction. Subjects who had read a description of a person's behavior with instructions to form an impression of the person subsequently recalled behaviors in much closer proximity to one another if those behaviors exemplified the same trait than if they exemplified different ones. This clustering was not evident when subjects read the same behavioral descriptions with instructions to remember them.
Cuing effects. If trait-behavior clusters are formed, recalling the trait concept that defines a given cluster should cue the recall of those behaviors that are contained in it. Put another way, behaviors exemplifying a given trait concept should be more easily recalled if the trait concept is recalled than if it is not.
Evidence supporting this prediction was obtained by Wyer and Gordon (1982) . Subjects were first given several trait adjective descriptions of a person, followed by a series of behaviors. Some of these behaviors exemplified the traits provided, whereas others exemplified their bipolar opposites. Moreover, some behaviors exemplifying each trait were favorable, and others were unfavorable. Subjects who received this information were told either to form an impression of the person (impression formation set) or simply to remember the information presented (memory set). Finally, subjects were asked to recall as much of the information as they could.
When subjects had read the information with an impression formation set, they were more likely to recall behaviors exemplifying a particular trait if they had also recalled an adjective describing this trait (p = .46) than if they had not (p = .20). This difference suggested that the traits subjects remembered cued their recall of the associated behaviors. This is what one would expect if trait-behavior clusters had been formed and were later used as the basis for recall. In contrast, these cueing effects were not evident among subjects who had received the information with a memory set. These latter subjects recalled a given behavior with the same probability regardless of whether they had recalled a trait adjective that could be used to describe it (.21 vs. .20) .
It is important to note that the recall of a trait adjective did not facilitate the recall of behaviors that were descriptively inconsistent with it. Specifically, behaviors under impression objective conditions were not remembered appreciably better when subjects had recalled an adjective that was descriptively inconsistent with the behavior (.34) than when they had not (.27 ). This implies that the trait-behavior clusters contain only those behaviors that can be interpreted in terms of the concept defining these clusters and do not contain behaviors along the entire trait dimension. This is consistent with assumptions concerning the encoding processes that underlie the formation of these clusters.
Trait-category set size effects. The third set of data that bears on the existence of trait-behavior clusters also supports our assumption that these clusters are formed spontaneously. An understanding of these data requires consideration of Postulates 12 and 13. These postulates imply that if behaviors are organized into trait-behavior clusters and if no interbehavior associations are formed among the behaviors within each cluster, the likelihood of recalling any given behavior in a cluster will decrease as the total number of behaviors in the cluster increases. Evidence that this is in fact the case was obtained by Gordon and Wyer (1987) . In some conditions of this study, subjects with an impression formation objective read a description of 18 behaviors. Three of these behaviors exemplified one trait, 6 exemplified a second trait, and 9 exemplified a third trait. In some cases, subjects were told at the outset that "it might help them to know" that the target possessed the three traits implied by the behaviors. In other conditions, however, the traits were not mentioned.
When the behaviors exemplified traits that were similar in favorableness and (on the basis of normative data) likely to be found in the same person, set size effects occurred regardless of whether subjects had prior knowledge of the nature of these traits. Note that the total number of behaviors was the same in all cases. Therefore, if subjects had not spontaneously organized the behaviors into different trait categories but rather had treated them as a single undifferentiated list, these effects would not have occurred. The fact that these effects were similar regardless of whether a prior expectancy existed suggests that subjects spontaneously encoded the behaviors in terms of trait concepts. This finding provides further support for the assumption that the encoding and organization of behaviors into trait-behavior clusters is an inherent part of impression formation.
Formation of Interbehavior Associations
The results described above suggest that behaviors are typically encoded in terms of trait concepts without thinking about them in relation to one another, and thus no interbehavior associations are formed between them. However, an exception to this rule is implied by Postulate 6; that is, when subjects do not have trait-based expectancies for what a person is like, they encode the person's behaviors in terms of trait concepts that they select themselves. In such cases, however, they may not always be confident of the trait concepts they have used to interpret the behaviors. Therefore, if the evaluative implications of the trait concepts they have selected differ in favorableness (thus making it difficult to extract an evaluative person concept), they may review the behaviors contained in each trait-behavior cluster to decide if they have used the appropriate concept to encode them. Because this decision requires thinking about the behaviors within each cluster in relation to one another, interbehavior associations should he formed among the behaviors. It seems reasonable to assume that the number of associations formed as a result of this cognitive activity, and therefore the number of associative pathways to any given behavior, will increase with the total number of behaviors in the cluster. If this is true, the processes implied by Postulate 6 imply an increase in the accessibility of a given behavior with the number of behaviors in the same cluster, the effects of which may override the effects of set size per se (see Equation 1).
Data reported by Gordon and Wyer (1987) support this. Other conditions of their study were identical to those described under the section Trait-category set size effects except that the behaviors exemplified traits that differed in favorableness and were less likely to be found in a single person. When subjects were given explicit trait-based expectancies, the probability that they recalled a given behavior decreased as the number of other behaviors exemplifying the same trait increased. When the trait adjective descriptions were not provided, however, the probability that they recalled a given behavior increased with the number of other behaviors implying the same trait.
These results provide strong support for Postulate 6. Note that the behaviors contained in a trait-behavior cluster should generally be easier to recall if associations have been formed among the behaviors than if they have not. Further support for this implication of the model, reported by Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Srull (1984) , will be noted in a later section.
Conclusion
Two quite different types of evidence support the validity of Second, the generation of predictions on the basis of the model often involves a consideration of several different postulates in combination. In the present case, predictions concerning the formation of trait-behavior clusters were derived on the basis of not only Postulate 1 but also Postulates 9-13 (concerning storage and retrieval). The positive category set size effects obtained by Gordon and Wyer (1987) are predicted on the basis of not only these postulates but also Postulate 6. In short, the postulates we propose, considered in different combinations, permit a wide variety of predictions to be made. This will become increasingly evident as we go on.
Evaluative Concept Formation
Formation of an Evaluation-Based Person Representation
According to Postulate 3, subjects with an impression formation objective attempt to extract a coherent evaluative concept of the person. Evidence in support of this postulate has been reported by Hartwick (1979) . Moreover, its applicability appears to be quite general. For example, Cohen and Ebbesen (1979) had subjects under either an impression or a memory set observe a videotape of a person. Afterward, all subjects rated the person along a series of trait dimensions. Subjects who had viewed the sequence with an impression formation objective tended to make judgments that were evaluatively consistent with one another. This was much less true of subjects with a memory objective who had observed the person. This suggests that subjects with an impression formation objective extracted an evaluative theme from the information they acquired. In contrast, memory set subjects, who presumably had not extracted such a theme, based their judgments on a review of the individual behaviors they had observed, the implications of which were not always evaluatively consistent.
In combination, Postulates 3 and 4 have implications for which specific features df information are likely to provide the basis for an evaluative concept of the person. Postulate 4 implies that if the initial information about a person has clear and consistent evaluative implications, the evaluative concept formed of the person will be based on these implications, and the later information will be largely ignored. In combination with Postulate 14, this means that evaluative judgments of a person are often more influenced by the initial information presented about the person than by later information. This prediction is supported by evidence of primacy effects of information on evaluative judgments (N. H. Anderson, 1965; N. H. Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987) .
At the same time, our model also implies several constraints on the generalizability of primacy effects. For one thing, the effect may often be restricted to evaluative (i.e., liking) judgments. According to Postulate 14, trait judgments will often be based on the concepts defining the trait-behavior clusters that have been formed. The nature of these concepts, unlike the evaluative person concept, does not necessarily depend on where the behaviors that exemplify them occur in the series.
Second, Postulate 4 implies that if the initial information presented about a person is evaluatively neutral, or if its implications are unclear, it will have very little influence on judgments in relation to the later information (Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985) .
In other words, a person who is described by neutral behaviors followed by favorable ones will be evaluated favorably and not neutrally.
Moreover, if the evaluative implications of the initial information are evaluatively inconsistent, subjects may not try to reconcile these inconsistencies immediately. In fact, a substantial amount of information may be required before subjects extract an evaluative concept. Evidence supporting this contention was obtained by Srull, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart (1985, Experiments 5 and 6) in research that also has implications for other aspects of our model. Subjects read a series of 50 behaviors with instructions to form an impression of the person described. The list consisted of 10 blocks of five behaviors each, with each block containing two behaviors with positive implications for a particular trait (e.g., friendly), one behavior implying its bipolar opposite (unfriendly), and two behaviors that were evaluatively neutral. Thus, although the set of behaviors in each block was evaluatively biased, this bias was not great because contradictory information was also presented.
Once an evaluative concept of the person has been formed, subjects presumably attempt to reconcile behaviors that are inconsistent with this concept, and this leads the subjects to asso- ciate these behaviors with others (Postulate 7). These associations increase the likelihood that the inconsistent behaviors are later recalled. However, the formation of these associations
should not occur until after a coherent concept of the person has been extracted. The point at which subjects extract an evaluative concept of the target person can be inferred from the point in the series at which the recall of evaluatively inconsistent behaviors begins to increase in relation to the recall of other types. Data relevant to this possibility are presented in Figure   2 for one of the two experiments reported by Srull et al. (1985) (The data from the other experiment were virtually identical.)
Differences in recall do not occur until Block 5, and the recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors is not appreciable until Block 7. According to the logic outlined here, this means that subjects did not form an evaluative concept of the person until they had read at least 25 specific behaviors.
These data support the assumption that subjects will, in fact, spontaneously extract an evaluative concept of the person even when a clear trait-based characterization is not provided. However, the data also suggest that this concept is not formed immediately unless the initial behaviors all have similar evaluative implications (see also Bargh & Thein, 1985) . When the first information presented about a person has unclear or conflicting implications, its effect on the concept formed of a person may be minimal.
Independence of Trait-Behavior Clusters and Evaluation-Based Person Representation
Trait-behavior clusters are postulated to be formed as a result of encoding behaviors in terms of trait concepts. Postulate 9 states that these clusters are both independent of one another and independent of the evaluation-based person representation.
The validity of this postulate has not been established directly.
However, several results would be difficult to account for without making such an assumption. For example, in a study by Wyer and Gordon (1982) , subjects with either an impression set or memory set read eight trait adjective descriptions of a person and then 40 behavior descriptions. If subjects with an impression set form a single integrated representation of the person, they should have better recall of all types of information. However, this was not the case. Impression set subjects recalled more behaviors than did memory set subjects, but they did not have better recall of the trait adjectives that the behaviors exemplified.
Additional difficulties for a single-representation assumption are created by the effects of behaviors that are descriptively versus evaluatively related to trait-based expectancies. In Wyer and Gordon's (1982) study, behaviors that were descriptively consistent were recalled better than descriptively inconsistent ones.
Moreover, trait adjective concepts appeared to cue the recall of the behaviors they exemplified. Overall, however, behaviors that were evaluatively inconsistent with trait descriptions were recalled better, and this was true regardless of which trait adjectives subjects recalled. Although the possibility of a single representation cannot be completely dismissed, we have been unable to construct a plausible representation that could account for these results and for the other findings we have summarized.
More direct ways to test the validity of the independence assumption should of course be considered. For example, if the various representations we postulate are stored independently in memory, it should be possible to manipulate their relative accessibility by having subjects perform a prior (e.g., judgment) task that requires their use. These differences in accessibility should produce differences in the type and pattern of behaviors that subjects recall subsequently. This possibility remains to be explored. However, the assumption that multiple representations of the target person are formed is not only viable but also useful in accounting for both (a) the dissimilar pattern of effects of experimental variables on recall and judgment and (b) the potential situation specificity of person impressions. This will become clear shortly.
Responses to Expectancy-Inconsistent Behavior
Once an evaluative concept of a person has been formed, behaviors of the person are thought about in terms of this concept and thereby become associated with it (Postulate 5). Moreover, behaviors that are evaluatively consistent with the concept, and therefore easily encoded in terms of its features, become more strongly associated with the concept than do neutral or evaluatively inconsistent behavior.
On the other hand, Postulates 7 and 8 imply that when subjects encounter a behavior that is inconsistent with an evaluative concept, two things occur. First, subjects typically think about the behavior in relation to other behaviors that have evaluative implications, leading to the formation of interbehavior associations (Postulate 7). Second, they may mentally review those behaviors that are consistent with the concept they have formed to marshall support for its validity. This activity strengthens the consistent behaviors' association with the concept (Postulate 8).
Postulates 5 and 8 on the one hand, and Postulate 7 on the other, have opposite implications for the relative ease of recalling behaviors that are evaluatively consistent or inconsistent with the central person concept. Specifically, consistent behaviors should have a recall advantage over inconsistent ones because of their stronger association with the concept (Postulates 5 and 8). However, the cognitive activity implied by Postulate 7 should lead to the formation of more associative pathways to inconsistent behaviors than to consistent ones, and this should make the inconsistent behaviors relatively more accessible.
These factors should combine to give both consistent and inconsistent behaviors an advantage over neutral ones. However, the relative ease of recalling consistent and inconsistent behaviors depends on which of the two factors has the greater influence.
Most studies have found a recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors over consistent ones, which in turn have an advantage over neutral behaviors (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Srull, 1981; Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) .
These findings suggest that differences in the number of interbehavior associations formed typically have more influence on recall than do differences in the strength of each behavior's association with the central concept. As will be seen, however, the proposed model implies many qualifications to this general conclusion.
Formation of Interbehavior Associations
Many interpretations can be given to the better recall of inconsistent items. For one thing, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors may simply be more novel or distinctive and therefore capture more attention. Alternatively, subjects may engage in more elaborate encoding of expectancy-inconsistent behaviors in an attempt to explain their occurrence (Hastie, 1984) . This activity will lead to the behaviors becoming more strongly associated with concepts that compose subjects' general world knowledge, increasing the number of retrieval routes at the time of recall. Although both of these factors may contribute to the recall of expectancy-inconsistent behaviors, neither is central to the formulation we propose, and neither can account for many of the results we have obtained.
According to Postulate 7, the recall advantage of inconsistent items is due to subjects thinking about them in relation to other behaviors with evaluative implications. Because this establishes a highly interconnected set of associations, the probability of recalling an inconsistent item in the course of the search implied by Postulate 11 is greater. However, because some of the associative links that are formed will be connected to consistent behaviors, these items will benefit as well. In contrast, there should be no influence on the recall of neutral or irrelevant behaviors because these remain completely isolated in the network (see Figure la) . Several studies by Srull (1981; Srull et al., 1985) are relevant to these aspects of the model.
Effects of inconsistent behaviors on the recall of consistent
ones. Two studies (Srull, 1981 In one study (Srull et al., 1985 , Experiment 3) the number of inconsistent behaviors presented was varied (0,6, or 12) and the number of consistent and neutral behaviors was held constant.
As in Srull (1981) , the proportion of consistent behaviors recalled increased with the number of inconsistent behaviors presented (.30, .39, and .47 when 0, 6, and 12 inconsistent behaviors were presented, respectively). However, the proportion of neutral behaviors recalled was nearly identical in each case (.29,
.28, and .31, respectively). In addition to supporting the implications of Postulate 7, the above results eliminate alternative explanations of the recall advantage of expectancy-inconsistent information. For example, if the effect were simply a result of expectancy-inconsistent behaviors being more distinctive, or thought about more extensively, the differences in recall probabilities noted here would not be expected.
Interference effects on the formation of interbehavior associations. If the recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors is due to the establishment of interbehavior associations, this advantage
should be decreased when subjects are prevented from engaging in the cognitive activity that leads these associations to be formed. Two studies (Srull, 1981, Experiment 4; Srull et al., 1985 , Experiment 1) support this hypothesis. Subjects were given a series of consistent and inconsistent behaviors with instructions to repeat each behavior aloud none, one, two, or three times immediately after it was presented. This rehearsal might be expected to increase the learning of each behavior.
However, it should also make it more difficult for subjects to think about the rehearsed behavior in relation to others. This difficulty should increase with the number of rehearsals subjects are required to perform. This suggests that the number of rehearsals should have a negative influence on the proportion of inconsistent behaviors recalled. In addition, the associations that result from thinking about the inconsistent behaviors often involve consistent ones. Therefore, preventing this activity should produce a decrement in the recall of the latter behaviors as well. This decrement, however, should not be as great as the decrement in recall of the inconsistent behaviors, because the number of associations involving consistent behaviors are rela-lively fewer to begin with. Furthermore, the number of repetitions should have no effect on the recall of neutral behaviors, which are not involved in the formation of interbehavior associations. These implications of the model received strong support in both studies. Specifically, the recall of inconsistent behaviors decreased substantially as the number of repetitions increased.
Although the recall of consistent behaviors also decreased, this decrement was much less pronounced. As a result, when subjects were required to repeat each behavior three times, the recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors was either eliminated or, in one study (Srull, 1981 , Experiment 4), even reversed. In contrast, the recall of neutral behaviors was not affected by the number of repetitions. These results provide strong support for our assumptions concerning not only the role of interbehavior associations in recall but also the specific types of behaviors involved in these associations.
Many other factors may of course decrease subjects' ability or motivation to perform the cognitive work required to form interbehavior associations. For example, it may not be performed if the inconsistent behaviors are apparently attributable to situational factors rather than to the person who performed them . Additional factors that may influence the formation of these associations will be discussed in later sections of this article.
Sequential Search Processes in the Retrieval of Behavioral Information
The present model not only accounts for differences in the relative probabilities of recalling different types of behaviors but also generates predictions of both the order in which these behaviors are recalled and the time required to do so. Two additional studies investigated these implications. In the first (Srull, 1981 , Experiment 1), subjects recalled the behaviors in writing, and sequential search processes were evaluated on the basis of conditional recall probabilities. In the second (Srull et al., 1985 Postulate 11 implies that the search begins at the central concept node and proceeds along a pathway to a behavior that is most strongly associated with it. One immediate implication of this assumption, in combination with Postulate 5, is that the first behavior recalled is more likely to be consistent with the central person concept than to be inconsistent or neutral. In fact, this is the case. In an analysis of 288 free-recall protocols, Srull (1981) found that the first behavior recalled was much more likely to be consistent (55%) than either inconsistent (25%) or neutral (20%). These data suggest that inconsistent and neutral behaviors are associated about equally strongly with the central person concept. Note that these results are in marked contrast to the overall probabilities of recalling these different types of behaviors.
Having identified the first behavior as a result of the processes described above, subjects typically proceed to another behavior along one of the associative pathways emanating from the first one recalled. If no such pathway exists, however, the subject is forced to return to the central concept node and reinitiate a search from that node. This assumption, in combination with Postulates 5 and 7, has several implications:
1. First, suppose subjects have recalled a consistent behavior.
Because consistent behaviors are theoretically only associated with inconsistent behaviors, the likelihood of recalling an inconsistent behavior following a consistent one should be very high. In fact, this was the case in Srull's (1981) study. Moreover, results of the later study, presented in columns 2-4 of Table 1, show an identical pattern. 2. Now suppose subjects have recalled an inconsistent behavior. This behavior may be associatively linked to either a consistent or inconsistent behavior. Therefore, the recall of each type of behavior after the recall of an inconsistent behavior should be relatively high and about equal, whereas the likelihood of recalling a neutral behavior should be low. In Srull's (1981) study, the recall of an inconsistent behavior was followed most often by the recall of a consistent one (47%), with inconsistent behaviors and neutral behaviors being recalled less frequently (20% and 32%). In Srull et al. (1985, Experiment 4;  see Table 1 ), the relative likelihoods of recalling consistent and inconsistent behaviors after the recall of an inconsistent behavior were reversed (25% vs. 45%). Most important, the likelihood of recalling a neutral behavior after an inconsistent one was fairly high in both experiments, contrary to expectations. We will discuss this discrepancy from predictions presently.
3. Finally, suppose subjects have recalled a neutral behavior.
This behavior is theoretically isolated from all other behaviors in the system. Therefore, subjects must return to the central concept node and reinitiate their search from that location. If this is the case, they should recall a consistent behavior with a high probability, for reasons noted earlier. This is in fact the case. In Srull's (1981) study, a consistent behavior was recalled after a neutral one 84% of the time, whereas an inconsistent behavior or another neutral behavior was recalled only 12% or 4% of the time, respectively. Results of Srull et al. (1985, Experiment 4) are similar. Thus, with one exception (the relatively high probability of recalling a neutral behavior after recalling an inconsistent one), these results are in line with the various postulates. It should also be noted that these predictions are extremely subtle, and to the best of our knowledge, no other existing model can make any predictions at all concerning these types of data.
Interbehavior response times. Now consider the implications of Postulates 7 and 11 for the time interval between the recall of successive behaviors. This interval should increase with the number of associative pathways that must be traversed in order to get from one behavior to the other. The interbehavior re-7 These probabilities are based on conditions in which the numbers of consistent, inconsistent, and neutral behaviors presented were the same (12 in each case). However, other conditions of the study, in which the numbers of each type presented were unequal, yielded identical conclusions. To see this, suppose a consistent behavior has been recalled.
Then, the next behavior recalled should most often be an inconsistent one. However, the average time to identify it should be short, as it is often directly connected to the preceding consistent one. However, in those cases in which a consistent or a neutral behavior is recalled after a consistent one, the time required to do so should be long because these behaviors can be activated only by returning to the central node and restarting the search.
The results show this to be the case.
Alternatively, suppose subjects have recalled an inconsistent behavior. These behaviors are often connected directly to either a consistent behavior or another inconsistent behavior, and so the time required to identify either of these behaviors should be short. However, the time required to identify a neutral behavior should be long, because it can be reached only by returning to the central node. Again, this is what the results show.
The most interesting case arises when subjects have recalled a neutral behavior. Here, the parallel between conditional recall probabilities and interbehavior response times breaks down.
Specifically, if subjects have recalled a neutral behavior, the likelihood that the next item is a consistent one should be high, as was noted earlier. To recall this behavior, however, subjects must still return to the central concept node. Therefore, the time to recall a consistent behavior after a neutral one should be long and not appreciably different from the time required to retrieve other types of behaviors after a neutral one. This is again what the results show; that is, the likelihood of recalling a consistent behavior after a neutral one was very high, but the time required to do so was no different than the time required to recall other types of behaviors. More generally, note that it not only takes a relatively long time to retrieve any behavior after a neutral one, but it also takes a long time to retrieve a neutral behavior itself, regardless of what other type of behavior was recalled just before it. This confirms the assumption that neutral behaviors are isolated from the others in the representation and do not enter into interbehavior associations. The only piece of evidence against this conclusion was noted earlier, that is, there is a relatively high probability of recalling a neutral behavior following an inconsistent one. Perhaps the best explanation for this is that some of the neutral behaviors are not entirely neutral with respect to their evaluative implications. Alternatively, the encoding of these behaviors may be biased in such a way as to make them consistent with the evaluative concept formed of the target person. In either case, such neutral behaviors might then be involved in the interbehavior associations that are formed during the encoding of an inconsistent item. Much more sensitive scaling procedures than have been used previously would be needed to pick this up.
Bolstering Processes
The results of the studies summarized in the previous section provide good support for our assumptions about inconsistency resolution. According to Postulate 8, however, the evaluative inconsistency between a person's behavior and the general concept formed of this person should often give rise to bolstering; that is, subjects may review the behaviors that are consistent with their concept of the person to confirm its validity. This activity theoretically strengthens the associations of the consistent behaviors with the concept and therefore should increase the likelihood of later recalling them. The typical recall advantage of inconsistent over consistent behaviors suggests that the effects of bolstering are usually less than the effects of inconsistency resolution. However, this may be because the time that subjects have available to process the information is often limited. If this is so, giving subjects more opportunity to think about the information they receive should increase the likelihood of bolstering, and this should be evidenced by an increase in the recall of consistent behaviors.
Several recent studies support this possibility. Wyer and Martin(1986, Experiment 1), for example, gave subjects a trait description of a person and then a list of behaviors that varied in their evaluative consistency with this description. In some conditions, after receiving the behavioral information, subjects performed a 5-min distractor task before being asked to recall the behaviors. These subjects recalled inconsistent behaviors better than consistent ones. In other conditions, however, subjects were asked to think more extensively about the target person during the 5-min period between information presentation and recall. These subjects recalled more consistent behaviors than inconsistent ones. One interpretation of this reversal is that the latter subjects took advantage of the 5-min thought period to engage in bolstering. This interpretation is strengthened by results of a more recent study by Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, and Martin (1987) . In this study, the opportunity to engage in postinformation bolstering and to engage in on-line bolstering were independently varied.
Specifically, the person's behaviors were presented sequentially for either 8 s each or 12 s each. Then both groups of subjects either were given an opportunity to think about the person described for 5 min or were distracted from doing so. When subjects had little opportunity to engage in either on-line or postinformation processing, inconsistent behaviors were more likely to be recalled than consistent behaviors. However, when more opportunity was provided, either while the behaviors were presented or afterward, the recall of inconsistent behaviors was unaffected, whereas the recall of consistent behaviors increased to a level that exceeded the recall of the inconsistent ones.
These data therefore suggest that the recall advantage of inconsistent behaviors is far from universal. Although this conclusion is not surprising, the value of our model is that it localizes the factors that influence the recall of each type of behavior. The model permits a clear a priori conceptualization of the conditions in which the recall of consistent or inconsistent behaviors is likely to predominate.
Descriptive Versus Evaluative Factors in Inconsistency Resolution
In the preceding discussion we did not distinguish between the descriptive and evaluative relatedness of a target person's behaviors with the initial trait characterization. According to Postulate 7, however, the cognitive activity that stimulates the formation of interbehavior linkages is a result of attempts to reconcile evaluative inconsistencies (e.g., to understand how a good person could do a bad thing, or how a disliked person could do something admirable) rather than descriptive ones (e.g., to understand how an honest person could do something dishonest).
A study in which the two types of consistency were independently manipulated (Wyer & Gordon, 1982) supports our assumptions. Subjects who had read about a person with an impression formation objective showed better recall of behaviors that were evaluatively inconsistent rather than consistent with initial trait-adjective descriptions. When the evaluative implications of the behaviors were held constant, however, subjects had better recall of those behaviors that were descriptively consistent with the trait descriptions. This presumably resulted from the fact that subjects used trait-behavior clusters as bases for recall rather than the evaluative person representation (see also Postulate 10). Two other studies (Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984; Wyer & Martin, 1986 , Experiment 1) provide further evidence that the inconsistencies that stimulate the formation of interbehavior associations are evaluative.
This does not mean, however, that descriptive factors play no role in the resolution of inconsistencies. For example, subjects may give lower priority to the reconciliation of evaluative inconsistencies when the behaviors involved are not related to the trait characterization on which their evaluative concept of the person is based. We will elaborate on this possibility below. are evaluatively consistent with the person concept to confirm its validity. Evidence that each of these activities may occur has been summarized in previous sections. As we have noted, however, the performance of these activities makes considerable demands on the cognitive system. It is therefore likely that, in many situations, only some of these activities will be performed.
A priority system may govern their performance, with low priority activities giving way to higher priority ones when information processing demands are high.
The priorities that are given to certain activities are logically constrained. For example, one cannot reconcile inconsistencies between a person's behavior and a general evaluative concept of the person unless this concept has already been formed. Other, less obvious priorities are suggested by the results of studies we have described. For example, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors are recalled better when subjects have only a limited opportunity to think about the information they receive, whereas consistent behaviors are often recalled better when additional time is provided. This suggests that inconsistency resolution often takes priority over bolstering. In addition, Hastie (1980) found that the recall advantage of evaluatively inconsistent over evaluatively consistent behaviors was greater when the behaviors were descriptively related to the trait characterization of the target (on which the general concept of the person was presumably based) than when they were not. This suggests that subjects who engage in evaluative inconsistency resolution may sometimes give higher priority to behaviors that are descriptively related to their general conception of a person than to behaviors that are only evaluatively related to this conception. Results reported by ! In our discussion of inconsistency resolution, we have focused on the effects of inconsistencies on the recall of behaviors that were actually presented. We have not considered the possibility that subjects sometimes report behaviors that were not presented. In fact, there is no reason to predict these intrusion errors on the basis of the formulation we propose. Intrusions most often occur when the information presented exemplifies a prototypic schema, and an understanding of this information requires inferences about other, unmentioned events or attributes (cf. Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Graesser, 1981; Spiro, 1977) . The behaviors presented to subjects under the conditions of concern here, however, occur in different situations and are individually interpretable. There is no reason to expect that schema-based inferences of unmentioned behaviors will be made in these conditions and therefore no reason to predict that intrusions will occur. In fact, the proportion of intrusion errors that occur in person memory research is typically about 1 % (Srull, 1981; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) . This priority system can account for several findings that we have already described. For instance, in Srull's (1981, Experi- ment 4) study, in which subjects were prevented from thinking about the behaviors presented in relation to one another, only the first three processes described in the preceding paragraph should have been performed. Consequently, as Srull found, the recall of both consistent and inconsistent behaviors was relatively poor, with consistent behaviors having a slight edge over the inconsistent ones. In contrast, giving subjects a moderate opportunity to think about the behaviors in relation to one another should lead to the pursuit of the fourth goal (inconsistency resolution). As a result, the recall of inconsistent behaviors should increase substantially in relation to the recall of consistent ones, as Srull's results also indicate. Finally, when subjects are given still more opportunity to engage in impression-directed processing, bolstering may occur. Consequently, the ease of recalling consistent behaviors may increase to a level equal to or greater than that of inconsistent ones, as research by Wyer and Martin (1986, Experiment 1) and as the aforementioned study by indicate.
A more direct examination of these priorities was conducted by . Subjects who had previously been given a trait description of a target person read a series of 36 behaviors of the person that were (a) descriptively related to and evaluatively consistent with the trait description (D c ), (b) descriptively related to and evaluatively inconsistent with the description (DO, (c) descriptively unrelated to the trait description but evaluatively consistent with it (Ec), or (d) descriptively unrelated to the trait description but evaluatively inconsistent with it (Ej).
These behaviors were presented for 4 s, 8 s, or 12 s each. reasoned that if one type of goal-directed processing takes priority over another, the recall of the behaviors involved in the first type of processing should increase to asymptote more quickly with an increase in available processing time than the recall of behaviors involved in the second type.
Results shown in Figure 3a provide some support for the priority system we have postulated; that is, the recall of evaluatively inconsistent behaviors that are descriptively related to trait-based expectations for the target increased to asymptote much more quickly than the recall of the other three types of behaviors. This suggests that reconciling inconsistent, descriptively related behaviors (Goal 4a) took priority over either reconciling inconsistent behaviors that were descriptively unrelated to the concept of the person (Goal 4b) or bolstering (Goal 5).
A contingency in these results is noteworthy. Specifically, the data described here were obtained under conditions in which subjects believed they would receive a series of only 20 behaviors. In such conditions, subjects may believe they can easily assimilate all of the information they will receive and therefore decide to defer extensive processing of the behaviors until they have all been presented. In other words, they may not engage in low-priority activities unless a large amount of time is available with little else to do. If this is the case, different results should occur when subjects anticipate receiving more information than they can remember and therefore believe that they must evaluate its implications on-line. This appears to be true. In other conditions of their study, told subjects that they would be receiving a series of 90 behaviors rather than only 20. Data obtained under this condition are shown in Figure 3b . The recall of descriptively related consistent behaviors (D c ) and the recall of descriptively unrelated inconsistent ones (Ei) both increased to asymptote quickly under these conditions. This suggests that subjects who anticipated receiving a large amount of information increased their efforts to engage in lower priority cognitive activities (Goals 4b and 5a) on-line.
Consequently, only bolstering with behaviors that were descriptively unrelated to the central person concept (Goal 5b) was not performed.
The results of this preliminary study should be interpreted 9 The priorities assigned to the first two objectives (trait encoding and evaluative concept formation) assume that initial trait descriptions of the target person are not provided. If these descriptions are given before any behaviors are presented, the evaluative concept may be formed at the outset, before any trait encodings of the behaviors are performed. with some caution. However, our findings do suggest the need to identify the priorities that underlie different types of impression-directed cognitive activity in order to gain a complete understanding of memory and impression formation. By specifying the effects of different impression-related processes on the recall of different types of behavior, the model we propose provides a conceptual device for understanding the nature of these priorities and suggests a methodology for investigating them.
Cognitive Basis for Judgments
Our concern with the cognitive representations that are formed of persons is based on the assumption that we can gain insight into the cognitive bases of judgments and decisions that concern these persons. As was noted earlier, predictions of judgments of a person from the implications of the information that subjects can recall about the person are tenuous at best. Attempts have been made to specify the conditions in which subjects are likely to use the implications of the information they can recall as a basis for judgments (cf. Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979; . However, this work has not specified the cognitive mediators of judgments or the manner in which judgments are derived. By specifying both the nature of the representations that are formed and the judgment pro-cesses that surround their use, our model accomplishes this objective.
General Considerations
Postulate 14 implies that when a representation has direct implications for a judgment, this concept will be used without searching for specific behaviors. Therefore, although some implications of the behaviors may differ from those of the concept itself, these implications will not be reflected in the judgment that is made. This postulate is of particular interest when judgments are made of a person's likeableness. It is assumed that once an evaluation-based concept of a person has been formed, liking judgments should be based on this concept and therefore should be evaluatively consistent with it. On the other hand, for reasons noted previously, behaviors that are evaluatively inconsistent with the central concept should be better recalled. To this extent, the relation between subjects' estimate of their liking for a person and the implications of the behavior they recall may sometimes be negative.
The results of several studies are interesting to consider in this light. These studies appear to show that the first information about a person has the primary influence on judgments, whereas the last (more recently acquired) information is better recalled. In a typical study using this paradigm (e.g., Dreben et al., 1979; Lichtenstein&Srull, 1987; Wyer&Unverzagt, 1985) , subjects either receive a set of favorable behaviors describing a person followed by a set of unfavorable ones or receive a set of unfavorable behaviors followed by a set of favorable ones. Their liking for the person described is influenced primarily by the initial behaviors presented, consistent with Postulate 4. However, the more recently presented behaviors are evaluatively inconsistent with the person concept that is formed on the basis of the initial behaviors. Thus, they may be better recalled for this reason and not because of their recency per se.
Suppose, however, that subjects do not have the goal of forming an impression when they learn about the person's behaviors, and so they do not form a central evaluative person concept at this time. Then, they must compute their evaluation of the person at the time they are asked to report it. To do this, they will be required to use specific behaviors they can remember. In this case, subjects' judgments and the implications of the behaviors they can recall should be more highly correlated.
A recent study by Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) supports this reasoning. In some conditions of the study, subjects read a series of behaviors with instructions to form an impression of the person who performed them. In other, comprehension objective conditions, subjects read the behaviors with instructions to correct grammatical errors. Results obtained under conditions of the impression formation objective replicated previous findings; that is, subjects judged the target person on the basis of the first behaviors presented, whereas the most recent behaviors were better recalled. Moreover, judgments were uncorrelated with the evaluative implications of the recalled behaviors. In contrast, judgments by subjects with the comprehension objective were based on the most recent behaviors presented, and these judgments were correlated positively with the implications of the behaviors that subjects recalled.
Two additional studies may be sufficient to demonstrate the utility of Postulates 14 and 15 in accounting for judgment phenomena and the range of their applicability. One explored the effects of predicting a person's behavior on subsequent trait judgments. The second investigated the effects of instructions to disregard certain information.
Effects of Predicting a Person's Behavior on Subsequent Trait Judgments
In some instances, none of the concepts denning subjects' representations of the person will have direct relevance for the judgment they wish to make. In these instances, subjects theoretically revert to the evaluation-based representation of the person and base their judgments on both (a) the evaluative implications of the central concept and (b) the behavioral features of the representation that have descriptive implications for the judgment. Evidence consistent with these hypotheses was obtained by Wyer, Srull, and Gordon (1984) . Subjects read a set of trait adjectives describing a particular attribute of the person. Then they were asked to predict whether the person would engage in a series of behaviors that implied not only this trait but also a second trait that had either similar or different evaluative implications. Finally, subjects were asked to judge the target with respect to both the original trait and the other trait implied by the predicted behaviors.
According to the proposed conceptualization, subjects should form an evaluative concept of the person on the basis of the trait adjectives describing him. Then, when they are later asked whether the person would engage in additional behaviors, they presumably base their predictions on the descriptive consistency of the behaviors with the trait that led to the formation of the evaluative person concept. Therefore, they should (and do) predict that the person would in fact manifest these behaviors. During the course of making the predictions, however, the predicted behaviors presumably become associated with the central person concept. Therefore, suppose subjects are now asked to judge the target with respect to the trait implied by both the predicted behaviors and the original trait adjective description. These judgments should be based directly on the concept pertaining to this trait (Postulate 14), and therefore they should not be affected by the predicted behaviors. However, suppose instead that subjects are asked to judge the trait implied by the predicted behaviors alone. Because this trait is not directly implied by the central person concept, judgments of it will be based partly on the evaluative implications of this concept and partly on the descriptive implications of the predicted behaviors that have become associated with it (Postulate 15). Therefore, these judgments should be influenced by both sets of implications. The results obtained by Wyer, Srull, and Gordon (1984) show this to be the case and provide strong support for Postulates Hand 15. (For further support of these conclusions in a different research paradigm, see Carlston. 1980.) 
Effects of Instructions to Disregard Information on Later
Recall and Use of This Information
Perhaps the most direct application of the proposed formulation to judgment processes was performed in a series of studies by Wyer and Unverzagt (1985) and . The general issues of concern in these studies are the conditions in which subjects continue to be influenced by information that they believe to be irrelevant. The research is of particular interest in the context of the present discussion, because it bears on our assumptions concerning the independence of trait-behavior clusters and evaluation-based representations (Postulate 9) as well as on Postulates 14 and 15. The design of the studies is complex. Therefore, we will convey the essential features of the Wyer and Unverzagt study through an example and then will discuss its general implications in terms of our model.
Suppose that subjects read a series of behaviors a person has performed with instructions to form an impression of him and that the first and last behaviors in the series exemplify different traits (e.g., kind and dishonest). On the basis of Postulates 1 and 5, subjects should form three representations: (a) a traitbehavior cluster associated with kind, (b) a trait-behavior cluster associated with dishonest, and (c) an evaluation-based representation of the person as likeable (on the basis of the first information presented) that contains both kind and dishonest behaviors. All three representations, shown in Figure 4a , should be stored at a single memory location (in a "referent bin"; see . Suppose that after receiving this information, subjects are asked to judge the target's honesty, kindness, and likeableness. Subjects should judge the target to be kind, dishonest, and likeable on the basis of the central concepts of the representations that have direct implications for these judgments. Now suppose that immediately after receiving the initial (kind) behaviors, subjects are told that a mistake has been made and to disregard them. Subjects in this condition should be able to restart the impression formation process, forming new representations and storing them at a memory location that can be distinguished from the first one. Therefore, they should form a trait-behavior cluster pertaining to the attribute dishonest, and an evaluation-based representation that now has unfavorable implications, on the basis of the last behaviors presented (see Figure 4b ). If they are asked to judge the target under these conditions, subjects should judge him or her to be dishonest and unlikeable. They should also judge the target to be unkind. This is because no trait-behavior cluster has direct implications for this judgment, and no behavior with descriptive implications for the judgment is contained in the evaluative person representation. Therefore, the judgment is based only on the evaluative implications of the concept defining the evaluative person representation (Postulate 15). In short, the behaviors that subjects are told to disregard should have little effect on judgments in this condition.
In contrast, suppose subjects are instructed to disregard the last (dishonest) behaviors. By the time these instructions are given, subjects have formed all three representations (the two trait-behavior clusters and the evaluation-based representation). Subjects in this condition may be able to segregate the trait-behavior cluster containing the behaviors they are told to disregard from the representations containing information to be considered. Note, however, that the to-be-disregarded behaviors have already become integrated into the evaluation-based person representation at the time subjects are told to ignore them, and they cannot be segregated from the other behaviors in this representation once it has been formed. Consequently, the representations that remain for use in making judgments in this condition should resemble those in Figure 4c .
Therefore, suppose subjects are asked to judge the trait implied by the behaviors they have been told to disregard. As in the previous case, they will not base their judgments on the contents of the trait-behavior cluster they are supposed to ignore. Instead, they will revert to the evaluation-based representation and base their judgments on (a) the evaluative implications of the central concept and (b) a review of the behaviors contained in the representation that have descriptive implications for the judgment (Postulate 15). In this case, because the behaviors to be disregarded are still contained in the representation, these behaviors will influence trait judgments despite instructions to ignore them. Note, however, that these behaviors should not influence judgments of the target's likeableness. This is because the evaluative person concept is determined by the first behaviors presented. Therefore, their liking judgments, based on this concept, are uninfluenced by the last behaviors in the series regardless of whether subjects are told to ignore them. The data found by Wyer and Unverzagt were consistent with each of these predictions.
Applications and Extensions
The research summarized in the previous sections provides strong support for the various postulates of our model. In this section, we consider the model's applicability to impression formation in three situations that are different from the ones we have considered thus far.
Forming Impressions of More Than One Person
Thus far we have applied the model only to the impression formed of a single individual. A question arises as to whether similar processes are involved when subjects form impressions of more than one individual. Two conditions are of interest in this regard. One occurs when subjects attempt to form an impression of a group from information about its individual members. The second occurs when subjects receive information about several unrelated individuals at the same time and attempt to form an impression of each person separately.
Forming impressions of groups. Consider a situation in which subjects have the goal of forming an impression of a group of persons on the basis of information about its individual members. It is reasonable to suppose that the underlying processes are very similar; that is, subjects are likely to encode the behaviors in terms of trait concepts that are activated either by general expectancies or by the behaviors themselves. Moreover, they are likely to extract a general evaluative concept of the group and to interpret individual members' behaviors in terms of features of this concept. Thus, with one qualification, the representations formed of groups should be similar to those we have postulated to exist for individual persons.
The one qualification is important, however. It concerns the extent to which associations are formed among the behaviors pertaining to different group members. The formation of these A. All behaviors considered B. Disregard first (kind) behaviors C. Disregard last (dishonest) behaviors P + Figure 4 . Trait-behavior clusters and evaluation-based person representations available for making judgments when a series of kind behaviors is followed by a series of dishonest behaviors and (a) all behaviors are considered in making judgments, (b) subjects are told to disregard the first (kind) behaviors, and (c) subjects are told to disregard the last (dishonest) behaviors. (Ti, and T t represent kind and dishonest trait concepts, respectively; P+ and P-represent favorable and unfavorable person concepts; and i\ and b a represent kind and dishonest behaviors.) associations may depend on the particular nature of the group. Some groups, such as fraternities and work groups, are highly cohesive, and their members often need to interact effectively in order for the group to function. In such cases, it seems that subjects will attempt to reconcile the behaviors of an individual that deviate from the characteristics of the group as a whole (i.e., to understand how a person who behaves in an undesirable way can get along in a group that has generally desirable qualities, or how a person who behaves admirably can function in a group with undesirable characteristics). In this case, interbehavior associations similar to those implied by Postulate 7 should be formed. On the other hand, suppose the group being considered is one whose members do not necessarily interact and may not even know one another. Most groups about which people have stereotype-based preconceptions (e.g., Catholics, college professors, Blacks) are of this type. In these cases, it seems unlikely that the behavior of a particular member will be thought about in relation to the behaviors of other members in order to reconcile its occurrence. Rather, the member who manifests this behavior may simply be treated as an exception, and no attempt at reconciliation will be made (cf. .
This analysis has obvious implications. When the group about which impressions are to be formed is a highly cohesive one, the representation formed will be very similar to those postulated for single individuals, and the representations should affect recall in a similar way. Data reported by Srull (1981) suggest that this is the case; that is, behaviors attributed to individual members of a highly cohesive group were recalled better if they were inconsistent with the central concept of the group than if they were consistent with this concept. When the group being described is one whose members do not interact, however, no associations should be formed among the behaviors of its individual members. In this case, the recall of individual behaviors should be primarily a function of the strength of their association with the central concept denning the representation. This means that consistent behaviors should be better recalled (Postulate 5). This prediction has also been supported, both in Srull's (1981) study and in a more recent one by Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Srull (1984) .
A more subtle implication is also noteworthy. If direct associations are not formed among the behaviors of individual members of a loosely organized group, these behaviors should be recalled less well in general than should either the behaviors of an individual person or the behaviors of members of a highly cohesive group. Results obtained by Srull (1981) and Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Srull (1984) confirm this implication of the model as well.
These studies therefore support our speculation that the model can be applied to groups as well as to individuals. However, the results are of more general interest in understanding the effects of group stereotypes on the recall of behaviors of persons who exemplify these stereotypes. Specifically, they suggest that when a stereotype pertains to a general category of persons who do not necessarily interact, behaviors of stereotyped individuals will be better remembered if they conform to the stereotype than if they deviate from it. On the other hand, if the stereotype pertains to a cohesive group (e.g., a particular college fraternity), behaviors of individual members will be better recalled if they deviate from the group stereotype than if they are consistent with it.
Impressions of several unrelated individuals. In many situations (e.g., a cocktail party), we are called upon to form impressions of several individuals at once. It seems reasonable to assume that persons in such a situation will form separate representations of each individual. The recall of these representations, and the behaviors contained in them, should be governed by processes similar to those we have postulated.
Data bearing on impression formation under these conditions was obtained by Srull (1983) and by Srull and Brand (1983) . In the latter study, for example, subjects read descriptions of the behaviors of two different individuals with instructions either to form an impression of each person or to try to remember the behaviors they read. The number of behaviors attributed to each of the two persons was varied independently over experimental conditions. Subjects were later asked to recall the information they had read. The likelihood of recalling a given person's behavior under memory conditions decreased with both the number of behaviors attributed to this individual and the number attributed to the other person described (or, more generally, with the total number of behaviors presented). This suggests that subjects in this condition stored the behaviors as a single undifferentiated list at a single memory location. In contrast, although the likelihood of recalling a given person's behaviors under impression set conditions decreased as the number of behaviors presented about this same individual increased, it was unaffected by the number of behaviors presented about the other individual. This means that, in this case, separate representations were formed of each person. (For an elaboration of this reasoning, see Srull & Brand, 1983; .) It therefore appears that the model is also applicable when subjects form impressions of several persons simultaneously.
Effect ofPostbehavior Trait Descriptions on Person Impressions
There are many instances in which we do not receive information about a person's general attributes (e.g., general characterizations by others, information about the person's membership in a stereotyped social group) until after we have learned specific behaviors the person has manifested. A question arises as to what effect these postbehavior characterizations have on the representations we form.
These effects can also be derived from the model. As an example, suppose subjects read a list of behaviors a person has manifested, some of which are honest and others of which are cruel. In the absence of a prior indication of the person's attributes, subjects presumably form two trait-behavior clusters, one pertaining to honest and the other to cruel. Because the evaluative implications of these trait concepts differ in favorableness, subjects may also form associations among the behaviors within each cluster (Postulate 6). However, if the positive and negative behaviors are distributed randomly throughout the list, subjects will not form an evaluative concept of the person, and so an evaluation-based representation of the person will not be constructed. Now suppose that after reading the list, subjects learn that the person is considered by another to be cruel (or, alternatively, that the actor is Adolph Hitler, whom subjects believe a priori to have this attribute). Subjects should form an evaluative concept of the person on the basis of this general characterization, which is the first clear basis for doing so (Postulate 3). They may then think about the information they have received in relation to this concept. However, because the organization of this information into trait-behavior clusters has already been formed, no reorganization will occur ; for empirical support of this assumption, see Massad, Hubbard. & Newtson, 1979) . Rather, these clusters will become associated with the central person concept as units. Because the cruel cluster is evaluatively consistent with the central concept, it will be more strongly associated with the concept than will the honest cluster. The resulting representation should therefore resemble that shown in Figure 5 . These assumptions imply that subjects should more easily recall the consistent (cruel) behaviors than the inconsistent ones. Note that this prediction is directly oppo- Figure 5 . Evaluation-based person representation formed on the basis of a series of honest and cruel behaviors under conditions in which subjects are told after the information is presented that the target person is cruel. (r h and T c denote honest and cruel trait concepts, respectively; P-denotes an unfavorable person concept; and i h and b, denote honest and cruel behaviors, respectively.) site to the prediction we make when the general characterization of the target is conveyed before the behavioral information is acquired.
The aforementioned study by Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Srull (1984) supports this reasoning. Subjects were told to form an impression of someone who was either described by trait adjectives (intelligent or hostile) or identified as a well-known person who possessed the trait (Albert Einstein or Hitler). This characterization was given to subjects either before or after they read a series of behaviors that varied in both their evaluative and descriptive consistency with the characterization. When the general description of the target was conveyed before the behavioral information was presented, subjects subsequently showed better recall of behaviors that were evaluatively inconsistent with the characterization, replicating earlier findings (Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) . When the general characterization of the person was not conveyed until after the behaviors were presented, however, subjects showed better recall of behaviors that were evaluatively consistent with the general characteristics of the target. These results provide direct support for the conceptualization we have proposed.
Effects of Multiple Expectancies for a Person: General Versus Situation-Specific Person Impressions
We often acquire different, and sometimes conflicting, information for what a person is like. This raises the issue of how we respond to such discrepant characterizations and how we organize behaviors of a person in terms of them.
Data bearing on this question come from several sources.
First, evidence that subjects sometimes form more than one situation-specific representation of a person was obtained in a study by Trafimow and Srull (1987) . For example, when a target was simply described as friendly, subjects recalled more unfriendly than friendly behaviors, and this was true regardless of whether they were performed at home or at work. In other cases, however, a situation-specific expectancy such as friendly at home was created. In this case, subjects recalled a greater number of unfriendly than friendly behaviors if they were performed at home but an equal number of friendly and unfriendly behaviors if they were performed at work. Exactly the opposite was found when the target was expected to be friendly at work. The results of another study suggest that subjects form situationspecific representations of a person that are functionally distinct from more general characterizations (Wyer & Martin, 1986 ).
It appears that when the behaviors of a person in one situation A conceptually similar process appears to occur in the domain of group stereotypes (see .
Concluding Remarks
Our 
Explanatory Power
The 15 postulates of the model were often initially developed on the basis of empirical evidence. However, these postulates, considered both separately and in various combinations, can be used to derive a variety of hypotheses, and to account for a large number of phenomena, that extend beyond the empirical evidence on which they were originally based. As was noted previously, Postulate 1 (concerning trait encoding processes) was originally suggested by research on the influence of category accessibility on judgments. However, it has implications for the formation of trait-behavior clusters and therefore for memory phenomena as well. Our assumption that trait-behavior clusters and the evaluative person representation are stored and retrieved independently, which was based in part on person memory research, is also a central assumption in accounting for the effects of to-be-disregarded behaviors on recall and judgment. Postulate 6, concerning the formation of interitem associations, not only permits the model to account for set size effects but also predicts differences in the overall recall of behaviors associated with individuals or groups. Virtually all of the predictions derived from the model require not just one but several different postulates, in various combinations. Therefore, the formulation consists of an interrelated system of assumptions from which multiple hypotheses can be derived. The explanatory power of the formulation is therefore substantial.
Generalizability
The primary empirical evidence in support of the model has been obtained in research performed under conditions in which subjects are asked to form a person impression on the basis of trait and behavioral information and in which sufficient capacity is available to do so. However, the formulation can be applied to a wide variety of person memory and judgment phenomena. This is evident from the research we have summarized. For example, the model was used to predict differences between the recall of information about individuals and groups and to con- tions, certain of these processes may not occur, and this should be reflected by differences in the associations that theoretically exist among various components of the representations. These differences may be inferred from the amount, type, and order of information that is later recalled. Thus, any precise theoretical statement concerning the cognitive processes that underlie responses to person information may in principle be translated into assumptions about the type of representations that are constructed. Given the retrieval and judgment components of the model, these assumptions can be evaluated using both recall and judgment data. To this extent, the model is more flexible than our present explication of it may suggest.
The formulation we propose is generally compatible with the implications of alternative formulations of person memory and judgment. However, it is at once more general in its implications and more precise in its predictions. No other model known to us can generate predictions of both recall and judgment under conditions in which these variables are not clearly related to one another. In addition, although other models generate predictions that account for either the recall of expectancy-consistent information (cf. Taylor & Crocker, 1981) or the recall of expectancy-inconsistent information (cf. Hastie, 1980) , no other model is capable of generating predictions of the conditions that affect the relative recall of both types of information, of localizing this recall in specific cognitive processes, and of specifying the conditions in which these processes operate. Finally, no other model can easily account for the role of both descriptive and evaluative factors in both recall and judgment.
In summary, although the model we propose, like all models, is not without limitations, it nevertheless is able to account for a wide variety of recall and judgment phenomena. Continued application, evaluation, and modification of the model should prove useful to all those concerned with the processes of person memory and judgment.
